This post was developed by i2 as an advertorial for the Spring 2011 edition of RUSI’s (The Royal United Services Institute) Defence Systems.
In 2003, Saddam Hussein was on the run. With his chain of command eliminated, traditional intelligence efforts to track him down were failing. Col. James Hickey, U.S. Army, heading the intelligence operation to find Saddam, determined that the reclusive Iraqi dictator only trusted and communicated with family members of his own tribal group. As Hickey said, “We built a fairly elaborate estimate of who Saddam’s supporters were in the area; though it did provide security, it also worked against them. Once we learnt who did what, it allowed us to work against them.”1
Hickey and his team were using a nascent form of Social Network Analysis (SNA). In its purest form, SNA relies on examining the linkages between people and places within a defined group or locality in order to deduce the key decision makers or vulnerable links and where they are located. In this case, it was the pinpointing of Saddam’s chauffeurs that led to his historic capture.
Figure 1
Latest Comments